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The early years of the 21st century saw an increasing prominence of neuroscientific ideas in 
society at large. Popular science texts that drew heavily on neuroscientific findings became 
routine fixtures of bestseller lists, while neuroscientific concepts and imagery made regular 
appearances in novels, art galleries and museums. In the media, neuroscience became a 
standard reference-point for explaining topical social and political issues: the global financial 
crisis, ascendance of ISIS and massacre on Utøya Island were just some of the events 
explained with reference to the relevant actors’ neural processes. Campaigners against 
pornography, video games and social media began to employ neuroscientific concepts to 
paint the respective activities as dangerously addictive. Security companies advertised lie-
detecting brain scans to lawyers, governments, employers and insurance companies, and 
brain images were admitted as evidence in courtrooms to argue that accused criminals could 
not control their violent impulses. Vials of oxytocin were sold as ‘Liquid Trust’ for use in 
dating and the workplace, while 2010 saw the commercial launch of ‘Neuro Drinks’, a range 
of ‘drinks with a purpose’ that variously claimed to target the neurochemical foundations of 
sleep, alertness, mood, appetite control, libido, immunity and fitness.  
Many have celebrated the prospects the so-called ‘neuro-revolution’ offers for advances in 
medicine, business and politics (Lynch, 2009). However, the cultural enthusiasm for 
neuroscience also has its detractors. So far, the most vocal criticisms focus on the frequently 
incorrect or exaggerated nature of popular neuroscience claims. Yet accuracy is not the only 
– nor necessarily the most important – standard by which popular neuroscience can be 
appraised. In his recent book, Christian Jarrett (2015) argues that many ‘brain myths’ are not 
merely factually incorrect, but actively harmful to those who come in contact with them; 
many brain myths, for example, perpetuate damaging stereotypes or ideologies. While the 
factual accuracy of a given neuroscientific claim can be determined by neuroscientific 
experts, questions about that claim’s effects on society call out for a social psychological 
analysis. Social psychological theories of knowledge, communication, attitudes, emotion and 
behaviour are ideally positioned to conceptualise the socio-cultural ripple-effects generated as 
a piece of science leaves the laboratory and enters wider society. Likewise, established social 
scientific methodologies like surveys, interviews and textual analyses can empirically capture 
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the repercussions that neuroscientific ideas have for the individuals and communities who 
encounter them.  Fortunately, over the last few years, a growing body of research has been 
doing just that. In this article, we review what this research tells us about the key themes that 
characterise popular discussion of neuroscience, and the risks and opportunities that lie 
therein.   
Using neuroscience to encourage self-improvement 
Research exploring the ways neuroscientific concepts manifest in the public sphere has 
highlighted the centrality of discourses concerning self-improvement. In 2012, our research 
group published an analysis of 3,000 articles discussing brain research that had appeared in 
the British press in the previous decade (O’Connor, Rees, & Joffe, 2012). Our analysis 
showed that in this large sample, by far the greatest preoccupation related to ways individuals 
could enhance or protect their brain function. Almost half of the articles, flagged by titles like 
‘10 Scientifically Proven Ways To Boost Your Brain’, advised readers about lifestyle or 
dietary changes that would allegedly increase their neurocognitive capacity or guard against 
cognitive decline. Similar themes have been detected by other analyses of media coverage of 
neuroscience internationally (Thornton, 2011). It seems that this media trend has registered 
with the lay public: a recent interview study we conducted, which asked members of the 
public to describe their associations with ‘brain research’, found that respondents often 
mentioned ‘brain-training’ and expressed concern that they were failing to fully exploit their 
brain’s potential (O’Connor & Joffe, 2015). The interviewees also echoed a well-worn media 
trope in frequently comparing brain enhancement to physical exercise, implying that ensuring 
brain health requires a continual programme of self-discipline. 
What are the potential risks and benefits of this current interest in brain enhancement? So far, 
there is little evidence that commonly-advised brain enhancement techniques, such as playing 
brain-training games and eating fish oils, have substantive or sustained neurocognitive effects 
(e.g. Kirby et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2010). However, some have suggested that the 
experience of deliberately ‘working on’ one’s brain may nonetheless have positive 
psychological consequences. Neuro-enhancement practices intrinsically convey an 
understanding of the brain as plastic and malleable to individual will. Rose (2007) and 
Malabou (2008) suggest that consciousness of the brain’s plasticity may afford a greater 
sense of control over one’s life. Extensive research shows that the experience of self-
3 
 
determination is linked with a range of positive psychological, social and material outcomes 
(Deci & Ryan, 2008). 
However, this valorisation of individual autonomy also has a darker side. Many social 
psychologists have drawn attention to the role played by individualistic values in solidifying 
inequalities and obscuring the influence of socio-structural factors on individuals’ life-
outcomes (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007; Sampson, 1988). The brain enhancement trend coheres 
with a cultural context in which individuals are afforded sole responsibility for their future 
health, wealth and well-being. Thornton (2011) contends that appeals for brain-training 
ultimately function to trap people in “endless projects of self-optimization in which 
individuals are responsible for continuously working on their own brains to produce 
themselves as better parents, workers, and citizens” (p. 2). The worry is that exposure to 
constant appeals to ‘work on’ one’s brain will generate endemic guilt and anxiety about the 
insufficiency of one’s efforts, and that cases of neuropathology will ultimately come to be 
seen as the individual’s own fault. In a society facing increasing rates of dementia and 
psychiatric disorder, this will compound the difficulties of these already vulnerable 
populations.  
Individual responsibility for neurocognitive productivity may also place particular pressures 
on parents. Research shows that brain enhancement ideas frequently appear in popular 
parenting literature (Thornton, 2011), where parents are told they can boost their child’s IQ 
by adopting certain nutritional, recreational or socio-emotional practices. This advice is often 
socially loaded: women who work outside the home, opt not to breastfeed, or fail to heed 
warnings about ‘neurotoxins’ during pregnancy are frequently condemned as irresponsible or 
uncaring mothers (O’Connor & Joffe, 2013). Claims regarding the lasting neurobiological 
effects of early experiences have been enthusiastically adopted by policy-makers (Macvarish, 
Lee, & Lowe, 2014). In Britain, a 2011 governmental report backed by all political parties 
drew heavily on neuroscientific evidence to emphasise the moral and economic imperative of 
early intervention in the children of ‘problem families’, which would allegedly reduce 
teenage pregnancy, substance abuse, crime and unemployment (see Figure 1). Early 
intervention initiatives can indeed yield many positive results for families. However, they can 
also serve political agendas by situating the causes of social problems within parental 
failings, rather than structural issues of poverty and inequality. Since framing debate in terms 
of shrunken infant brains affords an emotive urgency and scientific gloss to these policy 
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agendas, neuroscientific ideas can be used to justify the withdrawal of social support systems 
and the stigmatisation of disadvantaged communities. 
It is, however, important not to be overly deterministic about the potentially negative 
repercussions of the media focus on brain enhancement. Recent studies show that while 
people often bring up these ideas when conversing about neuroscience, relatively few 
actually engage in brain enhancement practices (O’Connor & Joffe, 2015). Despite their 
strong media and policy presence, appeals for brain enhancement are not experienced as 
sufficiently compelling to have affected day-to-day behaviour. One exception is in 
universities, where there is increasing concern about student use of artificial cognitive 
enhancers: yet even here, the proportion of students who use such measures is under 10% 
(Singh, Bard & Jackson, 2014). Worries that brain enhancement discourses are feeding an 
increasingly competitive, individualistic society may therefore be somewhat premature. 
Nevertheless, a critical perspective on the ways brain enhancement can be drawn into socio-
political agendas remains necessary. Given the limited evidence of the effectiveness of brain 
enhancement exercises, there is also an opportunity cost to consider: most people’s leisure 
hours are limited, and time spent playing brain-training computer games is time not spent in 
activities with demonstrable benefits for physical and psychological health, such as 
exercising or connecting with loved ones. 
Using neuroscience to underline group differences 
A further theme evident in research exploring the ways neuroscientific concepts manifest in 
society at large is the use of neuroscience to underline and explain differences between social 
categories. In the media, many of the group divisions that exist in our society – relating to 
variables such as gender, sexuality, criminality and mental illness – are frequently traced to 
these groups’ possession of distinct neural characteristics (O’Connor et al., 2012). This theme 
is exemplified in the ubiquitous phrase “the [female/gay/depressed/criminal] brain”, which 
implies the existence of a homogeneous brain ‘type’ that is universally shared by all members 
of that category. Popular neuroscience can thus purvey essentialist representations of social 
groups as biological ‘kinds’ (O’Connor & Joffe, 2014a). 
Many welcome the advent of neuroscientific explanations of social difference, due to their 
perceived ability to ameliorate stigma. For instance, mental health charities strongly 
campaign for greater public awareness of the biological roots of mental illness, because they 
assume that this will foster more tolerant attitudes. Research shows that this expectation is 
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shared by people with psychiatric diagnoses, for whom neuroscientific explanations can be 
critically important resources in sustaining positive personal and social identities (Buchman 
et al., 2013). Neuroscientific explanations have also been recruited to justify arguments for 
less punitive responses to crime and addiction, and to support the ‘born this way’ narrative of 
sexual orientation, which has historically been a key plank of the gay rights movement. 
Endorsing biological theories of sexuality does indeed correlate with more positive attitudes 
towards sexual minorities (Haslam & Levy, 2006).  
Anti-stigma campaigners’ hope that neuroscientific advances will prove a panacea for 
fighting social prejudices, however, may be unrealistic. The psychological essentialism 
literature has amassed an impressive body of research showing that for many social 
categories, such as gender, race and obesity, biological explanations consistently promote 
stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). The literature shows 
more positive effects in relation to biological theories of mental illness and sexual orientation, 
yet even these are not unambiguous. While biological explanations of mental illness do 
reduce blame for inappropriate behaviour, they also increase fear, perceived dangerousness, 
harsh treatment and social distance (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006). Representations 
of homosexuality as biologically determined can be used to purvey an image of sexual 
minorities as intrinsically disordered (Kahn & Fingerhut, 2011). In the criminal justice 
system, neuroscientific explanations are not consistently linked with more compassionate 
responses to deviance: in some contexts, neuroscientific explanations can increase rather than 
decrease punitive attitudes and sentencing decisions (Saks, Schweitzer, Aharoni, & Kiehl, 
2014). Neuroscientific explanations of difference may therefore be a double-edged sword 
when it comes to intergroup relations.  
The ambiguous effects of neuroscience on stigma should not come as a surprise to anyone 
familiar with the attitude change literature. Decades of research show that gaining new 
knowledge is a poor predictor of attitude or behaviour change (Ajzen, Joyce, Sheikh, & Cote, 
2011). Indeed, due to the motivated nature of human reasoning, incoming scientific 
information is often reconstructed so that it supports, rather than challenges, existing values 
and beliefs (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011). This was vividly illustrated by a recent 
study we conducted, which analysed how representations of a particular study of sex 
differences in brain structure evolved as the study moved from the initial journal article, 
through a university press release, into the traditional media and online commentary 
(O’Connor & Joffe, 2014b). Our analysis documented how aspects of the research that 
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resonated with traditional gender stereotypes were preferentially emphasised by the press 
release, media accounts, and the researchers themselves in their interviews with journalists. 
Furthermore, elements of stereotypes not mentioned in the original research report, such as 
women’s greater affinity for parenting and ‘multitasking’, were reconstituted in media 
coverage as the key ‘findings’ of the study. Our results suggested that scientific research on 
sex difference offers an opportunity for society to rehearse and reinforce prevailing gender 
stereotypes, which then benefit from the air of science that brain-information bestows. Thus, 
due to the human propensity to interpret external information in line with existing socio-
emotional commitments, neuroscientific explanations of social difference may engrain rather 
than challenge existing group divisions.  
Using neuroscience as a rhetorical tool 
A final theme that runs throughout popular uptake of brain research relates to the use of 
neuroscience for rhetorical purposes. Early experimental research suggested that 
neuroscientific words and imagery have a persuasive effect that was termed a ‘seductive 
allure’: attaching irrelevant neuro-stimuli to an article made readers judge that article as more 
convincing (McCabe & Castel, 2009; Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2009). 
Neuroscience’s persuasive power outstrips that of other scientific fields: there is apparently 
something distinctively compelling about brain-based explanations (Fernandez-Duque, 
Evans, Christian, & Hodges, 2015). Our media analyses showed that this rhetorical advantage 
is extensively exploited in media dialogue (O’Connor et al., 2012). In our media data, the 
basic content of the brain information introduced was often superficial: it was put to 
explanatory effect and boasted the ‘feel’ of an explanation, but its actual explanatory power 
was weak. For instance, observing that children’s neural activity changes while playing video 
games is not surprising, since any activity necessarily has unique neurochemical correlates. 
Yet this finding (and the fMRI images that illustrate it) can be effectively deployed to argue 
that modern technology is defiling the minds of today’s youth. Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Illes 
(2005) coined the term ‘neurorealism’ to describe the process by which neuroscience research 
is used to validate a certain view of the world. For instance, neuroscientific evidence might 
be recruited to prove that prisoners ‘really are’ intrinsically depraved, or that religious 
experiences ‘really do’ lead people to higher mental planes. In pointing to neural correlates of 
a phenomenon, writers can portray themselves as dispassionate observers demonstrating the 
simple fact of their worldview’s basis in the natural order. The result is that research is used 
to support thinly disguised ideological arguments and predetermined policy agendas.  
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Thus, neuroscience’s ability to imbue arguments with objective, scientific authority make it 
an effective vessel for propagating beliefs, values and ideologies. This is worrying, since 
those who exploit neuroscience’s rhetorical power for commercial or political gain jeopardise 
the public’s relationship with science more broadly. Public trust in science currently remains 
high, despite ongoing high-profile controversies over issues like MMR vaccination and 
climate change (Ipsos MORI, 2014). However, this trust is precarious: for many people, 
science also invokes a sense of fear and intimidation. People without a scientific background 
tend to be acutely conscious of the disparity in knowledge (and hence power) between 
themselves and apparent scientific experts (O’Connor & Joffe, 2014c). As a consequence of 
this imbalance, they typically defer to those who speak about science in an authoritative 
manner, even when the scientific argument is equivocal or under-developed. Rhetorical uses 
of neuroscience could therefore deter people from contributing to public debates or 
manipulate them into supporting agendas that are against their interest. Political exploitation 
of neuroscience thus has far-reaching implications for the quality of democracies and public 
spheres. 
It is, however, important not to overstate the risks inherent in neuroscience’s rhetorical 
power. The original experimental evidence of neuroscience’s ‘seductive allure’ has proven 
challenging to replicate (Farah & Hook, 2013). Emerging research suggests that the seductive 
allure may indeed exist, but in an extremely context-dependent way (Scurich & Shniderman, 
2014). Specifically, people who already agree with a given proposition show the neuroimage-
credibility effect when the neuroimage supports their own opinion, but those affiliated with 
opposing positions do not. Thus, it should not be assumed that laypeople will automatically 
capitulate to arguments that appeal to ‘neurorealism’. When the argument is one in which 
they have a prior investment, laypeople are capable of marshalling resistance and 
counterarguments, or indeed re-appropriating the same scientific principle to suit their own 
purposes. For instance, findings of sex differences in brain structure can be recruited to 
support both religious and feminist conceptions of gender, by construing the brain differences 
as ‘proof’ of the power of either divine design or cultural role-divisions (O’Connor & Joffe, 
2014b).  
Finally, it is important to remember that despite the extensive media coverage, for many if 
not most of the lay public, neuroscience remains mere background noise in everyday life. 
Many people do not notice its prominence in the media, and certainly do not actively seek its 
input in their day-to-day activity (O’Connor & Joffe, 2014c). Until placed in a position where 
8 
 
neuroscience suddenly becomes personally relevant (for instance, when one develops a brain 
disorder), neuroscience’s direct influence on everyday thought and behaviour may be limited. 
In analysing neuroscience’s social implications, it is important not to overestimate the sway it 
holds over the lay public: indeed, doing so would ironically perpetuate the very ‘neuro-hype’ 
that is under criticism (Pickersgill, 2013). 
Conclusion 
Neuroscience’s prominence in contemporary public spheres shows no signs of diminishing. 
As neuroscience’s position in society expands, it is important that its wider social and 
psychological implications continue to be scrutinised. Empirical research on the topic has 
highlighted a number of conditions that should guide consideration of this phenomenon. First, 
neuroscience’s effects on lay populations are not linear or predictable: scientific information 
is mediated through complex social psychological systems that can reject, reconstruct or 
repurpose it. Careful research is required to uncover these patterns. Second, discussion of 
neuroscience’s societal effects tends to focus on the ways it could transform society, yet the 
ways it can solidify existing features of social reality are equally deserving of attention. 
Evidence collected to date suggests that the most critical implications of neuroscience may lie 
in reinforcing, rather than revolutionising, the status quo. Finally, there is a clear role for 
social psychology to play in delineating the position neuroscience occupies in the 
contemporary public sphere. Most existing discussion of the trend comes from neuroscientists 
themselves, who tend to focus on the factual (in)accuracy of popular neuroscience claims. 
While there is certainly a place for such evaluation, establishing truth/falsehood contributes 
little to uncovering the substantive effects that a piece of knowledge has as it moves through 
society, since a scientifically sound idea can easily be used in socially destructive ways. To 
fully understand the promises and perils inherent in popular reconstructions of neuroscience, 
the theories and techniques of social psychology must be applied to unpick how the 
widespread circulation of neuroscientific concepts affects how we see ourselves, other people 
and the world around us.  
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Figure 1. Front cover of the 2011 governmental report Early Intervention: Smart Investment, 
Massive Savings  
